Zimmerman: The New Public Diplomacy: the Winning Move in Revolutions

New public diplomacy as a tool for revolution
leaders and diplomats of other sovereign states.2 These activities, including exchange programs, language training,
3

governments attempt to sway the opinions of their own nations. In contrast, it is used to negotiate with the publics
of other nations as a hybrid form of international relations.
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large groups of people has empowered sub-national actors and increased their national and international legitimacy.4
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build legitimacy.5, 6

Background
the international community, allowing protesters to disseminate their messages of non-violence. As a result,
7

descending into a civil war.

8

corruption and oppression as well. Images from protests in the southern part of the country saturated the Internet
and the revolution swiftly spread to the streets of the capital, Tunis. In a mere twenty-nine days, Tunisians were
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Introduction

History has shown that the reactions of the national military or security forces often determine whether a popular
revolution lives or dies.9 The national forces are a tool used by a regime to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force. During civil uprisings, clashes between protestors and security forces often turn violent. This results

desire for self-rule and freedom from oppressive regimes, and they all faced seemingly insurmountable odds
against dictators who had proven their willingness to use force to remain in power. Where the protestors differ is

safety, and that of their families, is tied to the survival of the regime. No longer able to remain neutral, security

several factors, such as government monopoly of the media and the shifting allegiance of factions of the military,
chose, with some small exceptions, to push forward with peaceful protests. Those tactics led to the swiftest and
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effective that they were able to compete successfully with the dictatorship for the loyalty of the security forces.
in depth.1
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personnel are forced to choose a side, and may be forced to commit acts they would not normally in order for their

The tools

avoiding violent confrontations and focusing instead on winning the support of the security forces. The uprising
became a competition between the protestors and the regime for the loyalty of the armed forces.

To win over regime supporters, protestors needed to undermine regime legitimacy while enhancing their own

The players
A question of legitimacy
Tunisian security apparatus. Directly controlled by the president, they numbered somewhere between 120,000 to
10

Dictatorships rely on the support of the masses and receive their political power from the authority endowed by
17

were impromptu, but in a matter of days, democracy advocates began a public diplomacy campaign to highlight
regime abuses by posting and widely disseminating photos and cell phone videos of regime violence. This included
outlets round the world.18 This was done in conjunction with strong messages conveying the protestors adherence
11

due to its unusual separation from the autocratic regime.12, 13 Internal funding for the army was minimal, barely
14

security forces received 50 percent more funding than all of the military branches combined.15 Despite this, the
small force was considered professional and distinctly apolitical.
The loyalty of the presidential security forces was unwaveringly with President Ben Ali but the allegiances of

Social media as a tool of public diplomacy

forces remain neutral, the protestors geared their movement and their message towards ensuring that the army and
police were not forced to choose the side of the regime in order to ensure their own safety. The revolution was not

19
20

and army.

The rules

majority of the population was in contact with someone connected to the revolutionary platform.21
16

As the movement grew, pages were created to help protect the identities of those that wanted to share information
on the unrest. Some examples include,
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Shifting power relations

23

of censorship and made available to the international public. In addition, bloggers added their voices to the din,
providing public opinion and additional detailed information about incidents occurring across the country.24
They shifted from supporting the regime to becoming fence-sitters or in some cases, supporters of the opposition.
News focused on spreading information about Tunisian events that were not covered by major news outlets.25

majority of the violence. The Tunisian police and military forces were not trained in crowd control and had severe
26

Most importantly, this free access to uncensored information painted a clear picture of the protestors and the
the anonymity of social media was used to ensure that protester motivations and intentions were clear and widely
wanted members of the security forces and those outside the inner circle to

against staunchly non-violent protestors, the police became increasingly alienated from the regime and its goals.
This is elegantly portrayed a now infamous picture, which depicts a Tunisian policeman with tears streaming down
his face, pointing his gun into the crowd. This alienation was only compounded by the fact that the protestors had
made their non-violent intentions clear.29

Conclusion

Non-violence as public diplomacy
of thousands of protestors crowding the streets of the capital city of Tunis. The army had already made clear its
With a strong communications platform underfoot, Tunisian protestors had to ensure that the images disseminated
30

protestors themselves became their message. Adherence to non-violence was probably one of the most strategically
responses only further strengthened the legitimacy of the protest movement and earned them the sympathy of the
population, the police and military, and the international community.27
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the regime, but meant no harm to people representing the regime. When uprisings turn violent, police must use
2012.
violent intentions by maintaining high standards of behavior. Protestors would stop looters they saw in the streets
and agent

provocateurs.28

Foreign Affairs.

Some violence did occur, but it rarely escalated past the odd thrown stone. As a result,

Foreign Policy
situation from one where their safety was tied to the survival of the regime to one where they had the freedom
to choose sides based on beliefs rather than necessity. When placed in this neutral position, and able to see the
conduct of both sides, the army and the police began to side with a non-violent public and turn against the regime.
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